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Archibald Low’s radio-controlled aircraft, 1917 
Kettering Bug, 1918 Denny Radioplane, 1945 

Civilian Uses of RPAS 
• Advertising  
• Agriculture 
• Building inspections 
• Cattle herding 
• Construction site survey 
• Customs & border protection 
• Disaster response 
• Environmental sensing & 
research 
• Filmmaking 
• Firefighting 
• Land surveying & mapping 
 
 
• Mineral exploration 
• News reporting 
• Parcel delivery 
• Police 
• Powerline, pipeline, & rail 
track inspections 
• Real estate photography 
• Search & rescue 
• Ship inspections 
• Telecommunications relay 
• Traffic monitoring 
• Wildlife monitoring 
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FAA Assumptions 
Instrument Flight Rules 
Controlled by a remote pilot 
Not autonomous 
Complies with ATC instructions 
Accident Record 
• Army accident rates1: 
– Unmanned aircraft: 49 per 100,000 hours 
– Manned aircraft: 4 per 100,000 hours  
• USAF hull-loss rates2:  
– MQ-9: 4 per 100,000 hours flown 
– Manned aircraft: 0.4 per 100,000 hours flown  
• Small civilian RPA hull-loss rate:  
– ~ 300 per 100,000 flight hours 
 
1. Prather, C. (2013). Online report of Army aircraft mishaps. Flightfax, 26. Retrieved from www.safety.army.mil 
2. United States Air Force. (2015). Q-9 flight mishap history. Retrieved from http://www.afsec.af.mil 
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Overview of RPAS Human Factors 
1. Reduced sensory cues 
2. Teleoperation via radio link  
3. Remote pilot station  
4. In-flight transfer of control 
5. Flight termination  
1. Reduced Sensory Cues 
• Lack of natural cues (e.g. visual, auditory, haptic) 
• “Soda straw” view from on-board camera 
• No “see and avoid” 
Detect and Avoid Display 
 
2. Teleoperation Via Radio Link 
• Loss of link  
• Latencies 
• Link management 
• Lost link procedures 
 
3. Remote Pilot Station (RPS) 
17 
Laptop Pilot Station 
 
RPS Interfaces 
• Physical ergonomics 
– Unreachable controls  
– Difficult-to-read fonts and colors  
– Critical controls placed next to non-critical controls 
– Proliferation of displays 
 
• Cognitive ergonomics 
– Complicated menu structures 
– Inadequate feedback  
– Reliance on text displays 
– Multi-function controls  
4. In-flight Transfer of Control 
• Handovers at same console 
• Control frequency changes 
• Transfers between consoles in same RPS 
• Transfers between RPS 
 
5. Flight Termination 
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RPAS Critical Incident Study: 
Rationale 
• “Tombstone safety” in the  
20th century 
• Lack of data on minor RPAS 
events 
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Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
RPAS Critical Incident Study: Goals 
• Examine the feasibility of a method to collect the 
operational experiences of RPAS pilots  
• Provide independent and complementary data to 
supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
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RPAS Critical Incident Study: Approach 
• Focus groups with 2-3 pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events experienced 
while operating a remotely piloted aircraft 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
2. The rectification of a hazardous situation or error 
• Only reports that can be made public 
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Preliminary Results 
• 23 participants 
• 90 incidents described 
• Weight classes of the remotely piloted aircraft: 
 
 
Aircraft max takeoff weight     # of reports 
Less than 400 lbs       17 
2000-15,000 lbs        60 
Greater than 15,000 lbs      13 
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Problems Mentioned in Reports 
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Camera view illusion
Stale lost link mission
Weather
Lack of sensory information
Checklists
Data entry errors and slips
Maps and charts
ATC
Control transfer
Mode error/automation
Controls and displays
Link management and quality
Number of Mentions 
Example: Lost Link 
“We were flying really far out … about 90 kilometers 
from the antenna. But I passed some random mountain 
peak for about one second and the aircraft went into 
emergency mode. Luckily I had the correct emergency 
mode programmed. If I didn't, I could've lost the 
aircraft.” 
  
RPAS pilot report 
        
     
Stages of Lost Link 
 
Example: Lost Link Timer 
“The airplane … made many turnarounds due to it 
being out of link then … it would reacquire and … 
return on mission. This affected fuel burn. [So I] set 
time-out feature just short of the actual mission 
duration.” 
 
        RPAS pilot report 
 
Example: Lack of Sensory Information 
“We fly based on digital gauges. We don't hear or feel 
anything, like RPM changes …. The aircraft is supposed 
to level off, at say, 5,000 ft … As opposed to a real 
aircraft [where] you can feel the airplane leveling off, I 
couldn't determine if it was still climbing until I noticed 
it was 300 ft past its command altitude.” 
 
RPAS pilot report 
Stale Lost Link 
• Pilot awareness of lost link mission 
• Lost link mission needs regular updating 
• Lost link mission can be a form of “automation 
surprise” 
32 
Example: Stale Lost Link 
“At the beginning of the flight, the lost link procedure 
was valid, but the procedure was not updated later in 
the flight. At one point, had the lost link procedure 
been activated, it would’ve had the aircraft fly through 
terrain in an attempt to reach the next waypoint. 
However, the aircraft didn’t lose link and the error was 
caught in the handover to the next set of operators.” 
 
 RPAS pilot report 
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Example: Voice Latency 
“There is a delay between clicking the press-to-talk and 
talking. This is very difficult to manage when in very 
busy airspace, and listening for a gap to talk. 
Sometimes by the time we press the talk button, with 
the satellite delay, the gap is gone and we step on other 
aircraft.”  
  
 
RPAS pilot report 
 
 
Controls and Displays 
• Some RPS interfaces appear to be particularly 
error-productive  
• Shared payload and flight controls 
• Keyboard and consumer interfaces 
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Example Narrative: Keyboards 
“… an operator placed his manual on top of [the 
keyboard]. Accidently, this activated the GUI. Then more 
pressure was applied through handling the manual, on 
the space bar. As a result, it highlighted and armed, 
through several steps, the flight termination button. 
Luckily, the operator saw the countdown and caught it in 
time to deactivate this command.”  
 
 RPAS pilot report 
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Example: Data Entry Errors and Slips 
37 
“I went to put the gear down, but instead I 
turned the SAS  [Stability Augmentation 
System] off using the red emergency 
button. The aircraft went into a 20-degree 
bank and 5-degrees nose down. I was able 
to recover the airplane. I had developed 
muscle memory with the activation of the 
SAS disengagement button.”  
 
  RPAS pilot report 
 
Accessibility of RPS  
“In manned aircraft it is clear who is in command, but 
with UAS operations, there are multiple people who 
have a sense of responsibility for the aircraft. So when 
there is something that needs attention many people 
run to the GCS [Ground Control Station].” 
 
 
RPAS pilot report 
 
Maintenance 
Corrective 
Fault 
isolation 
Remove & 
replace 
Repair 
Preventative 
Test & inspect 
Software 
updates 
Time 
replacement 
Example: Mode Error during 
Control Station Transfer 
“During preflight, handover checks were being done … 
we had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake 
set, but when the radio handover switched to XXX, he 
didn’t have the parking brake set and the power was set 
at 80% ….  The result was the engine revving up, and the 
aircraft jumping its chocks.” 
 
 RPAS pilot report 
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Example: Unintended Transfer 
“I was preparing to take control of the aircraft from 
[another pilot station]. The transmitters from my GCS 
were accidently left on. When I slewed the directional 
antenna to get the picture of the aircraft (the down link 
info), this automatically gave me control of the aircraft. 
I was not intending to take control of the aircraft at this 
time.” 
 
 RPAS pilot report 
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Example: Camera View Illusion 
“Depending on how I do the landing …. [the moveable 
sensor camera] …will be used to make sure that we 
clear the turns. But sometimes, the sensor operator 
will move the  camera, which will make it look like I’m 
turning but I’m actually not turning. So I have to 
concentrate and make sure I don’t respond to that 
erroneous camera view.” 
 
 RPAS pilot report 
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Next Steps 
• Continuing to collect RPAS incidents 
• Results are being used to inform design 
guidelines for RPAS control stations 
• Incident reports are helping to identify under-
examined topics 
 
 (4) Properties  
of the interface 
(3) Control requirements 
(2) Display requirements 
(1) Task descriptions 
System performance requirements 
(5) General 
human 
factors 
principles 
Applying the Lessons to RPS Guidelines 
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Applying the Lessons to RPS Guidelines 
“The RPS should alert the pilot when 
the RPA encounters significant air 
turbulence.” 
“Payload controls should be 
separate from controls with 
safety-of-flight functions.” 
“The RPS should enable the pilot to 
maintain awareness of link strength.” 
“The RPS should enable the pilot to set the 
duration of a link outage that must occur 
before a lost link response is triggered.” 
“Two distinct and dissimilar actions of the 
RPAS crew should be required to initiate 
the flight termination command.”  
Examples 
Under-examined Topics 
1. Reduced sensory cues 
– How does reduced sensory information affect threat & error management? 
2. Teleoperation via radio link 
– What does ATC need to know about link interruptions? 
– How much voice delay is tolerable for pilot communications?  
– How do humans positively contribute to highly-automated, teleoperated systems? 
3. Remote pilot station  
– How does the accessibility of the RPS change team dynamics? 
– What maintenance tasks should be permitted while an RPS is controlling an aircraft?  
4. In-flight transfer of control 
– What are best practices for control transfers? 
– What design features are needed to support control transfers? 
5. Flight termination 
– What information is needed to support flight termination decision making?  
A Final Thought 
• Will there be a convergence between 
conventional aircraft and RPAS? 
46 
References 
Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016). Human factors guidelines for remotely piloted aircraft 
system (RPAS) remote pilot stations (RPS). Contractor report prepared for NASA UAS in 
the NAS Project. http://human-factors.arc.nasa.gov/ 
 
Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016). Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems. 
Ergonomics in Design, 24, 23-28. 
 
Hobbs, A. (In press). Remotely piloted aircraft systems. In S. Landry (Ed.). Handbook of 
Aviation Human Factors. London: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Hobbs, A. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems. In E. Salas & D. Maurino (Eds.). Human 
factors in aviation, 2nd edition (505-531). San Diego: Elsevier. 
 
